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NOTES
Assignment without Formal Change of Beneficiary of Life Insurance Policy
Having Revocable Beneficiary Clause
Two recent decisions of the Pennsylvania Superior Court and one of the
Kentucky Court of Appeals deal with related problems raised by the assignment
of a life insurance policy by the insured without a change of beneficiary in the
formal manner set forth in the policy. One, Lentley v. McClure,' held the
assignee entitled to the proceeds of the policy as against the named beneficiary.
The Kentucky case, Kash's Ex'r v. Kash,' denied to the beneficiary the right to
be subrogated into the assignee's claim against the insured's estate where the
assignment was by way of security and the claim secured had been satisfied out
of the proceeds of the policy. The third case, Wilson, to use, v. PrudentialIns.
Co.,3 held the assignee entitled to receive the cash surrender value after having
given the insured notice of his intent to demand the surrender value. These three
problems have been solved by the courts in a variety of conflicting ways, but there
may be distinguished in the cases several theories as to the nature of the beneficiary's interest in such policies. Where the insured does not reserve in the
policy the right to change the beneficiary, the latter acquires an interest in the
benefits-a so-called vested interest-which cannot be defeated without his consent.4 However, where the insured does reserve the right to change the beneficiary, most authorities call the beneficiary's interest an expectancy and deny
that it is a legally cognizable interest.5 A few jurisdictions say that the beneficiary
has a contingent right which may be defeated by the insured's exercise of his
power to change the beneficiary, even though that power be exercised in an
informal way, as by the simple act of assignment. 6 Finally, in a number of jurisdictions the beneficiary's interest is said to be vested, subject to be divested only
by the insured's formal exercise of his power to change the beneficiary.7 These
terms, however, appear unreliable in the prediction of judicial action and are
unsatisfactory for the purpose of explaining or justifying the court's results.
I.
In Lemley v. McClure, the court encountered a situation which, although
text writers are almost unanimous in upholding the assignee's right to recover,"
has produced much divergent opinion in various jurisdictions. Where the insured
has not reserved the right to change the beneficiary, -it is clear that the beneficiary
should prevail over the assignee since the insured in such a policy retains no
interest which he might transfer to the assignee. 9 Where the policy permits a
i. 122 Pa. Super. 225, 185 Atl. 878 (1936).
2. 260 Ky. 508, 86 S. W. (2d) 273 (1935).

3. 187 Atl. 251 (Pa. Super. 1936).

4. 2 COOLEY, BitErs ON INSURANCE (2d ed. 1927) i8oi; 6 COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAw (1930) § 1458, P. 2; VANCE ON INSURANCE (2d ed. 193o) § 144.
5. See VANCE, op. cit. supra note 4, § 147 and, e. g., Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v.
Swett, 222 Fed. 200, 204 (C. C. A. 6th, 1915).

6. See Rawls v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 253 Fed. 725, 726 (C. C. A. Sth, 1918).
7. VANCE, loc. cit. supra note 5 and, e. g., Goldman v. Moses, 278 Mass. 393, 397, 191 N.
E. 873, 874 (1934).
8. 2 COOLEY, op. cit. supra note 4, 8o5; COUCH, loc. cit. supra note 4; VANCE, op. cit.
supra note 4, § 147.
9. Harley, Adm'r v. Heist, 86 Ind. 196 (1882) ; see Notes (1925) 73 U. OF PA. L. REv.
295, 296, (1928) HAv. L. REv. 250, 251, and see authorities cited supra note 4 to the
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change of beneficiary, most courts, as in Lemley v. McClure, now allow the
assignee to recover.' 0 A quite numerous and influential minority, however, hold
the contrary. 1
The cases allowing the assignee to prevail proceed upon two quite distinct
theories. The view more frequently followed is that, under a policy with revocable beneficiary, the whole beneficial interest is retained by the insured.' 2 He
has full control over it at all times, and the designation of a beneficiary is confined
in legal effect to a mere direction to the insurer to pay over the proceeds to the
named beneficiary at the insured's death. The designation of a beneficiary does
not operate to create any legal relations until the insured dies. If, before that
event, the insured has parted with his interest in the policy, as by an assignment,
he no longer has a right to direct disposal of the proceeds, and his direction that
the insurer pay the named beneficiary can be of no effect. Less frequently relied
upon to sustain the assignee's recovery is the theory that the beneficiary acquired
a contingent interest in the policy which might be extinguished by the insured's
appointment of a new beneficiary, and that this is in fact accomplished by the bare
act of assignment.' 8 Although the procedure set forth in the policy for such a
change '4 has not been followed, that is a mere formal defect, which can be set up,
if at all, by the insurer alone. As is to be expected, many of the cases employ
both of these views to support their conclusion in the assignee's favor.
On the other hand, those jurisdictions which hold the beneficiary entitled to
the proceeds generally follow the view that the beneficiary has, during the ineffect that Wisconsin is the only jurisdiction permitting the assignee to recover against an
irrevocable beneficiary. Contra: Clark v. Durand, 12 Wis. 223 (i86o).
Io. Carnes v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 8i F. (2d) 8oo (C. C. A. 5th, 1936) ; Aetna Life
Ins. Co. v. Phillips, 69 F. (2d) 9Ol (C. C. A. ioth, 1934); Rawls v. Penn Mutual Life Ins.
Co., 253 Fed. 725 (C. C. A. 5th, 1918); Mutual Ben. Life Ins. Co. v. Swett, 222 Fed. 200
(C. C. A. 6th, 1915); Taylor v. Southern Bank & Trust Co., 227 Ala. 565, 151 So. 357
(1933) ; Webster v. Telle, 176 Ark. 1149, 6 S. W. (2d) 28 (1928) ; Merchants Bank v. Garrard, 158 Ga. 867, 124 S. E. 715 (1924) ; Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 248 Ill. App. 401
(1927) ; Potter v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., 216 Iowa 799, 247 N. W. 669 (933)
;
Elmore v. Continental Iife Ins. Co., IX3 Kan. 335, 291 Pac. 755 (193o) ; Atlantic Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Gannon, 179 Mass. 291, 6o N. E. 933 (19O); Bank of Belzoni v. Hodges, 132

Miss. 238, 96 So. 97 (1923) ; First Nat. Bank of Beeville v. Security Mutual Life Ins. Co.,
283 Mo. 336, 222 S. W. 832 (1920) ; Lemley v. McClure, 122 Pa. Super. 225, 185 At. 878
(1936) ; Davis v. Acacia Mutual Life Ins. Co., 177 S. C. 321, 181 S. E.'12 (935); Fuos v.
Dietrick, ioi S. W. 291 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907).
ii. Strickland v. Dyer, 92 S. W. (2d) 206 (Ark. 1936); Muller v. Penn Mutual Life
Ins. Co., 62 Coo. 245, I61 Pac. 148 (1916) ; Farra v. Braman, 171 Ind. 529, 86 N. E. 843
(19o8) (although the beneficiary's interest is here called an expectancy) ; Douglass v. Equitable Life Ins. Soc., 15o La. 519, 90 So. 834 (1922) ; Resnek v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 286
Mass. 305, 19o N. E. 603 (934) ; Sullivan v. Maroney, 76 N. J. Eq. io4, 73 Atl. 842 (19o9),
aft'd, 77 N. J. Eq. 565, 78 Atl. 150 (1910) ; Schoenholz v. New York Life Ins. Co., 234 N. Y.
24, 136 N. E. 227 (1922) (Cardozo and Pound, JJ., dissenting) ; Barron v. Liberty Nat.
Bank, 131 S. C. 443, 128 S. E. 414 (1925) [expressly overruled in Antley v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 139 S. C. 23, 137 S. E. 199 (1927)].
12. Mutual Ben. Life Ins. Co. v. Swett, 222 Fed. 2oo (C. C. A. 6th, 1915); Taylor v.

Southern Bank & Trust Co.,
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Ala. 565, 151 So. 357 (1933) ; Equitable Life Ins. Co. v.

Mitchell, 248 Ill. App. 4O (1927) ; Potter v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 216 Iowa 799,
247 N. W. 669 (1933); Elmore v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 131 Kan. 335, 291 Pac. 755
(1930) ; Missouri State Life Ins. Co. v. California State Bank, 202 Mo. App. 347, 216 S. W.
785 (1919) ; Davis v. Acacia Mut. Life Ins. Co., 177 S. C. 321, 181 S. E. 12 (1935).
13. Rawls v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 253 Fed. 725 (C. C. A. 5th, 1918); Carnes v.
Franklin Life Ins. Co., 81 F. (2d) 8oo (C. C. A. 5th, 1936) : Webster v. Telle, 176 Ark. 1149
6 S. W. (2d) 28 (1928) ; Merchants Bank v. Garrard, I58 Ga. 867, 124 S. E. 715 (1924);
Fuos v. Dietrick, 101 S. W. 291 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907).

14. The procedure most generally required is for the policy to be surrendered to the insurer along with an executed form requesting the change, which becomes effective on the
insurer's indorsement of the change on the face of the policy.
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sured's lifetime, a legally cognizable interest (some call it "vested") which can be
defeated only by the insured's exercise of his power to appoint a new beneficiary.
The assignment cannot, they argue, operate as a change of beneficiary because
the procedure for such a change, as set out in the policy, has not been adhered to,
and it is a familiar principle of law that a power must be exercised according to
the terms under which it was created. 1 To this rule, the cases dealing with substitution of beneficiaries recognize three exceptions: (i) where the insurer
waives, or is estopped to insist on, strict compliance 16 (but the insurer's payment
of the proceeds into court, after the insured's death, and its omission to insist on
strict compliance with the change of beneficiary clause would not be a waiver
which could affect the beneficiary's rights, for the authorities agree those rights
are vested at the moment of the insured's death,1 7 whether they were or not previously) ; (2) where the insured has done all in his power to effect a change, and
there remains simply a ministerial act to be done by the insurer (as to indorse
the change of beneficiary on the face of the policy) ;11 and (3) where there are
equitable grounds to perfect the imperfect exercise of the power (as where the
policy cannot be surrendered for indorsement because of the original beneficiary's
wrongful act) o The ordinary case of assignment clearly falls within none of
these exceptions, and consequently the assignee is not a substituted beneficiary
and can acquire at most only the interest the insured had in the policy: the right
to the proceeds if the beneficiary predeceased him, the right to change the beneficiary, to receive dividends earned by the insurer, the right to obtain the cash
surrender value of the policy. The beneficiary's interest in the policy remains
undisturbed by the mere transfer of the insured's interest in the policy, until, of
course, the assignee exercises his newly acquired privilege of changing the beneficiary.
The decision in Lemley v. McClure, besides recognizing the conflict in the
authorities and definitely committing Pennsylvania to the majority view, is especially clear in theory because the court distinguishes an earlier decision, Barner v.
Lyter,2 0 where, under substantially the same facts as in Lemley v. McClure, the
beneficiary had prevailed. The assignee's case had been based solely upon the
claim that he was a substituted beneficiary, but he failed because, according to the
court, the assignment of itself did not work a change of beneficiary. Thus, the
court in Leniley v. McClure reasoned that the assignee's rights as assignee--not
as substituted beneficiary-were res integer before it, and as there had been much
language in Pennsylvania cases involving other situations to the effect that the
I. I BACON, LIFE AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE (4th ed. 1917) §§404-411; VANCE ON
INSURANCE (2d ed. i93o) § 148; Grossman, Problems of the Insurer When Attempted Change
of Beneficiary is Incomplete, Irregularor of Doubtful Validity (1933) 13 B. U. L. REv. 391,
432.

16. Manning v. Ancient Order of United Workmen, 86 Ky. 136, 5 S. W. 385 (1887).
17. McDonald v. McDonald, 212 Ala. 137, 41, 102 So. 38, 41 (1924) ; BACON, op. Cit.
supra note 14, §406; 7 COOLEY, op. cit. supra note 4 at 6409; 2 CoucH, op. cit. supra note 4,
§321.

I8. Heydorf v. Conrack, 7 Kan. App. 202, 52 Pac. 700 (1898).
ig.McDonald v. McDonald,
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Ala. 137,

102

So. 38 (1924); Taff v. Smith, 114 S.C.

3o6, 103 S.E. 551 (1920). Most of the cases laying down the rule and its exceptions as to

substitution of beneficiaries deal with mutual benefit societies, but the principles underlying
those cases are recognized to be applicable to "old-line" policies permitting change of beneficiaries: Quist v. Western and So. Life Ins. Co., 219 Mich. 406, 189 N. W. 49 (1922) ; Carson v. Carson, I66 Okla. i6I, 26 P. (2d) 738 (i933) ; Shoemaker v. Sun Life Ins. Co., iox
Pa. Super. 278 (193o) ; I BACON, op. cit. supra note 14, §404; Vance, The Beneficiary's
Interest in a Life Insurance Policy (1922) 31 YALE L. J. 343, 359.
20. 31 Pa. Super. 435 (io6).
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beneficiary had a "mere expectancy", 21 the court was free to uphold the assignee's
recovery by adopting the view that the whole beneficial interest in the policy was
in the insured until he died and the beneficiary took thereafter only those benefits
which the insured had not otherwise disposed of in his lifetime.
The court in Lemley v. McClure, however, might well have adopted the
theory that an assignment effects a change of beneficiary and that only the
insurer may raise objections to defects in the procedure followed, and could have
distinguished Barner v. Lyter on the ground that the assignee failed to sustain
the burden of proving that the assignment had been intended as a change of
beneficiary. In fact, there had even been dictum in the earlier case to the effect
that only the insurer could object to the omission of formalities which are intended
solely for the insurer's protection. 22 Nevertheless, Lemley v. McClure takes the
opposite view and clearly recognizes the insured's full control of the policy in his
lifetime and the beneficiary's lack of any such legal interest as would require a
change of beneficiary to defeat it.
Considerations of both a legal and extralegal nature favor the view taken in
Lemley v. McClure. It pays respect to the insured's probable intent. In including a revocable beneficiary clause, his probable intent was to retain control over
property which is generally looked upon, even by the layman, as belonging to
him.22 In making the assignment his probable intent was that the assignee receive
the proceeds to the extent of his claim. 2 4 In addition, it favors, as against a volunteer, one who, in general, has parted with consideration. The minority view
accomplishes none of these results, nor is it based on any sounder legal principles.
The view that an assignment is in effect a change of beneficiary is objectionable
as a purely legal matter, particularly because an assignment is traditionally a
transfer of legal interests and is governed by principles of contract law, while a
change of beneficiary is the exercise of a power of appointment, which lies in the
field of property law.2 5 Moreover, it runs counter to the doctrine that a power
can be exercised only according to the terms of its creation, except in circumstances that are not here under consideration. Finally, adherence to this view
that the beneficiary is changed by the assignment raises numerous difficulties
where the facts are but slightly altered from those of Lendey v. McClure. Assuming, for example, an assignment by way of security, what should be the effect
of repayment of the debt before the insured dies? If the assignment works a
change of beneficiary, repayment must have the same effect, for clearly the paid
assignee should not remain as beneficiary. But who should replace him? The
only case to consider the problem contains dictum to the effect that the named
21. E. g., Birnie v. Birnie, 67 Pa. Super. 74, 78 (1917) ; Knoche v. Mutual Life Ins. Co.,
317 Pa. 370, 371, 176 Atl. 23o, 231 (1934).
22. 3 Pa. Super. 435, 439 (19o6).

23. For a view that control should be in the insured even where the beneficiary is irrevocable, see Vance, The Beneficiary's Interest in a Life Insurance Policy (1922) 31 YALE L.
J. 343, 360.
24. It is suggested in Note (1925) 73 U. OF PA. L. REV. 259, 299, that the insured's intent in making the assignment be sought to determine whether he wished to change the beneficiary or merely assign a right to the proceeds conditioned on the beneficiary's predeceasing
the insured, or simply to assign a right to certain endowment features of the policy. There
is nothing in Leinley v. McClure which would prevent the beneficiary from successfully
showing, by the use of legally admissable evidence, that it was not intended that the assignee
take the proceeds unconditionally. The holding of Lemley v. McClure is that on the bare
fact of assignment the assignee may take the proceeds even if there has been no change of
beneficiary.
25. Mutual Ben. Life Ins. Co. v. Swett, 222 Fed. 200, 205, 206 (C. C. A. 6th, 1915);
Taylor v. Southern Bank and Trust Co., 227 Ala. 565, 567, 151 So. 357, 359, 36o (933);
Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 248 Ill. App. 4O, 4o4 (1927) ; I BACON, op. Cit. supra
note 14, § 388; 7 COOLEY, op. cit. supra note 4 at 6443.
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beneficiary would not be restored and that the insured's estate would receive the
proceeds. 2 6 If help is sought in the insured's intent at the time he repaid the
loan, all the complexities of the subject of revival and survival of wills 27 are
introduced into a problem which can be fairly solved in a much simpler fashion.
The difficulties of the insurer in determining to whom the proceeds should be
paid would be immeasurably increased by a rule which made conclusive the
insured's intent in repaying the loan. On the other hand, applying the principle
of Lemley v. McClure to these facts, it is clear that repayment of the debt would
leave the insured still in full control of the policy, and, there remaining unaltered
his direction that the insurer pay the named beneficiary, it would be obeyed at
his death.
II.
The problem dealt with in Kash's Ex'r v. Kash is of quite recent origin;
however, most of the few cases dealing with it are opposed 2 to the Kentucky
court's conclusion which, as was pointed out above, was that the beneficiary
should not be subrogated into the assignee's claim against the insured's estate
where the debt for which the assignment was security has been satisfied out of the
proceeds of the policy. The issue is whether it was the beneficiary's property
which was taken when the assignee's claim was paid with the proceeds. According to the "expectancy" theory, the insured, having full control of the policy,
might create a lien against the proceeds in favor of the assignee without changing
the beneficiary. At the insured's death, the beneficiary's right to the proceeds
vests, subject, of course, to the lien which the insured previously created. The insured's debt is the primary obligation, and it has been satisfied out of the proceeds
of the policy-the surety fund which belonged since the insured's death to the
beneficiary. Thus, there is made out a clear case for the beneficiary's subrogation into the assignee's claim.
Those jurisdictions which regard the assignment as a change of beneficiary
would be expected to deny subrogation to the beneficiary, for at the insured's
death the beneficiary would take title only to that part of the proceeds which was
in excess of the loan. As to the rest the assignment would have worked a change
of beneficiary, and satisfaction of the insured's debt from the portion of the proceeds to which the beneficiary did not get title would, of course, not constitute a
case for subrogation. The decision in Kash's Ex'r v. Kash proceeds upon this
reasoning. A slight variant of it is found in Walker v. Penick's Ex'r,29 a Virginia case. Whereas in the Kash case the assignment changed the beneficiary
pro tanto and substituted the assignee to the amount of the debt, in Walker v.
Penick's Ex'r the assignment changed the beneficiary pro tanto but substituted
in his place the insured, who was thus free to give the assignee a lien upon the
estate's share of the proceeds. Under both views, the beneficiary has been dis26. McNeil v. Chinn, Ioi S. W. 465, 467 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907).
27. The problem is raised by the revocation of a will which itself revoked a prior will.
Some courts look to the testator's intent at the time he revoked the second will for the answer
to the question whether the first will be reinstated or whether an intestacy results.
28. Barbin v. Moore, 85 N. H. 362, 159 At. 409 (1932), 32 COL. L. REv. IO71; Katz
v. Ohio Nat. Bank, 127 Ohio St. 53I, I91 N. E. 782 (1934) ; Farracy v. Perry, 12 S. W. (2d)
651 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928). There is a group of cases in which the insurer is the assignee;
these are treated separately. Infra p. 208.
This case might better be treated below with the
29. x22 Va. 664, 95 S. E. 428 (1918).
other cases in which the insurer is the assignee; yet it contains reasoning broad enough to
make it accord with the decision in Kash's Ex'r v. Kash.
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placed to the extent of the loan, and the loan has therefore not been repaid out of
any of the beneficiary's property. 0
In support of the holding of these two cases, it has been said that the insured
by naming the beneficiary never intended to make him a creditor of his estate, 81
and this is probably correct. However, if the insured's intent be thought material, it should be sought in his pledging of the policy without doing anything
further toward changing the beneficiary. If he regarded himself as bound by a
legal obligation to repay the loan, with the proceeds of the policy serving as
security for that obligation, he must, under the doctrine of subrogation, be deemed
to have intended that the owner of the proceeds of the policy should become a
creditor of his estate, in the event that he himself failed to repay the loan during
his lifetime and that part of the proceeds were used for that purpose. Of course,
this argument assumes the essential point in dispute, that the assignment was not
a change of beneficiary.
There is a group of cases, those in which the insurer is the assignee, which
support the holding of Walker v. Penick's Ex'r, but by quite different reasoning.82 It is interesting that all these cases are from jurisdictions where an
assignment is held not to work a change of beneficiary and where the beneficiary's
interest is ordinarily called vested, subject to be divested only by a proper exercise
of the power to change the beneficiary. Yet, in all of these cases the assignee had
satisfied his claim out of the proceeds and the beneficiary has been denied subrogation. The explanation of these cases lies in the fact that (as in Walker v.
Penick's Ex'r) the policy, besides authorizing the insured to borrow from the
insurer on the policy, obligated the insurer to pay only the face of the policy less
all sums due the insurer under the loan clause. On these facts, in the first place,
the beneficiary's so-called vested defeasible interest is, by the terms of the policy,
subject to the superior right of the insured to borrow on the policy and of the
insurer-assignee to deduct from the proceeds the amounts due it. Furthermore,
from the point of view of subrogation, each of these cases has a different ground
for denying that right to the beneficiary. In one, 33 the court reasons that no property of the beneficiary is used to pay the loan because the insurer by the terms of
the policy contracts to pay only the face value less the amount due by virtue of
the loan. It is only this amount-not the full face value of the policy-to which
the beneficiary gets title. In another, 4 subrogation is denied because the loan on
the policy is in the nature of an advancement by the insurer of part of the sum it
is bound to pay at the insured's death, and does not create a debt owed by the
insured for which the proceeds might be a surety fund. In a third case," subrogation was denied because the proceeds were regarded as the primary fund
for payment of the loan, rather than as security for the insured's debt. Which30. In Landrum v. Landrum's Adm'x, I86 Ky. 775, 218 S. W. 274 (1920), subrogation
was denied because there had been in fact a change of beneficiary properly endorsed on the
policy. In Oetting, Guardian v. Sparks, IO9 Ohio St. 94, 143 N. E. 184 (1923), subrogation
was denied where there had been in form an assignment only, but the later case of Katz v.
Ohio Nat. Bank, 127 Ohio St. 53i, i9I N. E. 782 (1934), which granted subrogation, distinguishes the Oetting case on the ground that the assignment in that case was broad enough
to be a change of beneficiary.
33. Note (932) ii N. C. L. REv. i69, iIM.
32. Re Waldsburger, 78 Colo. 516, 242 Pac. 982, 45 A. L. R. 718 (1926); Wagner v.
Thieriot, 2o3 App. Div. 757, 197 N. Y. Supp. 56o (Ist Dep't 1922), aff'd, 236 N. Y. 588, 142
N. E. 295 (1923) ; Faris v. Fans, 76 Ind. App. 336, 13o N. E. 444 (I92i). Contra: Russell v. Owen, 2o3 N. C. 262, i65 S. E. 687 (1932).
33. Re Waldsburger, 78 Colo. 516, 242 Pac. 982. 45 A. L. R. 718 (1926).

34. Wagner v. Thieriot, 203 App. Div. 757,
236 N. Y. 588, i42 N. E. 295 (1923).
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N. Y. Supp. 56o (Ist Dep't

35. Faris v. Fars, 76 Ind. App. 336, 13o N. E. 444

(1921).

1922),

aff'd,
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ever of the above reasons be thought most persuasive, it is clear that these cases
are governed by principles quite different from those controlling the other cases
already discussed.
Finally, in Barbin v. Moore,386 another case from a jurisdiction which seems
to follow the view that the beneficiary's interest may be defeated only by a proper
exercise of the power to change the beneficiary, the beneficiary was subrogated
into the assignee's claim against the insured's estate, the assignee having satisfied
his claim out of the proceeds of the policy. The extent of the insured's interest
in
37
the proceeds was, the court said, a mere power to change the beneficiary; and
yet, it continued, the effect of the assignment was to encumber the beneficiary's
right to the proceeds with a lien in favor of the assignee,38 without changing the
beneficiary at all. Whatever may be the explanation of this apparent inconsistency, 9 the court is clearly correct in granting the beneficiary subrogation since the
assignment was by way of security and had been held not to work a change of
beneficiary.
III.
The right of the insured's assignee to receive the cash surrender value of
the policy-the problem considered in Wilson, to use, v. Prudential Insurance
Co.-presents more difficulties and more divergent views than either of the two
questions already discussed. To begin with, it is reasonable to assume the
assignee should not recover in those situations in which the insured himself could
not have recovered. It therefore becomes important to determine in what situations, because of the beneficiary's superior rights,40 the courts refuse to grant the
insured the right to receive the cash surrender value. Where the beneficiary is
not subject to change, it would seem that the insured could not surrender or
cancel the policy so as to defeat the beneficiary's interest without the beneficiary's
consent.4 1 If, however, the surrender clause of the policy designates the insured
by name as the one to whom the cash surrender value is payable

42

or if it is

"payable to the insured" 43 clearly the beneficiary's rights are conditioned on the
insured's not exercising his explicitly granted right of surrender. But where the
cash surrender value is payable to the "holder" or "owner" or merely "on surrender of the policy", the irrevocable beneficiary and not the insured is the one
entitled to receive it." Where the beneficiary is subject to change, the cases conflict in much the same manner as those in which the respective rights of bene36. 85 N. H. 362, 159 Atl. 409 (932), cited supra note 29.
37. Id. at 371, 159 Atl. at 414.
38. Ibid.
39. Perhaps the beneficiary joined in the assignment. If not, the mere fact that the
policy authorized an assignment would not resolve the difficulty, for in both minority and
majority jurisdictions the insured's right to assign is conceded. The conflict arises as to
what he assigns, an absolute right to the proceeds or merely a right if the beneficiary predeceases him, or to change the beneficiary, etc.
4o. The insurer's right to deny the assignee the cash surrender value because he has
not complied with formalities prescribed in the policy is not here being considered. The
insurer was permitted to insist upon a physical surrender of the policy in Kothe v. Phoenix
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 269 Mass. 148, i68 N. E. 737 (1929). The assignee may, however,
compel the insured to comply with the necessary formalities. Blinn v. Dame, 207 Mass.

159, 93 N. E. 6oi (Igri).
41. 2 CoucH, op. ct. supra note 4, § 333; 6 id. § i42o; Ferguson v. Phoenix Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 84 Vt. 350, 79 Atl. 997, 35 L. R. A. (N. s.) 844 (1g1).
42. Robinson v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 96 Kans. 237, 150 Pac. 564 (1915).
43. Blinn v. Dame, 207 Mass. 159, 93 N. E. 6oi (igii). But cf. Anderson v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 261 N. Y. 450, i85 N. E. 696 (i933), in which the word "insured" was held ambiguous and the court did not permit the insured to take advantage
of certain loan features of the policy without the beneficiary's consent.
44. Entwistle v. Travelers Ins. Co., 202 Pa. 41, 144, 5i Atl. 759 (902).
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ficiary and assignee in the proceeds of the policy are in question. Most courts
permit the insured to recover the surrender value either on the ground that he
alone has the full beneficial interest in the policy,45 or on the ground that the surrender by the insured was in effect a change of beneficiary. 46 A minority of
jurisdictions hold that the beneficiary's interest cannot be defeated except by a
change of beneficiary in accordance with the policy's terms.4 7 The surrender of
the policy is not such a change of beneficiary not only because of the differences
in procedure but also because the surrender is a termination of the policy, whereas
a change of beneficiary contemplates a continuation of the policy with simply an
alteration of the parties entitled to rights thereunder. s
In cases where the objection that the insured himself could not have obtained
the cash surrender value is not available--as where the beneficiary has released
his interest, or where the policy expressly makes the cash surrender value payable
to the insured, or where (in most jurisdictions) the beneficiary is subject to
change and is held not entitled to object to the insured's receiving the cash surrender value-the assignee still faces important obstacles to his recovery. In
several cases, the insured's right to the cash surrender value has been said to be a
personal one, which he cannot transfer to an assignee. 49 The thought is that,
while the beneficiary might be willing that his interest be defeasible by the insured, it does not at all follow that he would want any other person to have the
right to defeat it. 50 But most jurisdictions, applying the same principles as
govern other choses-in-action, reject this limitation on the insured's right unless
expressly contained in the policy.51
Finally, where the assignment is by way of security, one last obstacle may
bar the assignee's recovery in most jurisdictions. In accordance with familiar
principles of the law of pledge, the policy may not be realized upon to satisfy the
debt secured until after default by the insured and notice to him of the assignee's
intent to proceed against the security.5' Quite frequently the express terms of
the assignment authorize, upon the insured's default, a surrender by the assignee
without notice to the insured. 53 In some cases, this right is given where the
assignment merely authorized the assignee "to collect moneys to become due
45. Illinois Bankers' Life Ass'n v. Rhodes, 147 Ark. 191, 227 S.W. 403 (1921); Crice
v. Illinois Life Ins. Co., 122 Ky. 572, 92 S.W. 56o (i9o6); Cooper v. West, 173 Ky. 289,
190 S.W. Io85 (I917); LaLonde v. Roman Standard Life Ins. Co., 269 Mich. 330, 257 N.
W. 834 (1934).
46. Baxter v. Old National-City Bank, 46 Ohio App. 533, 189 N. E. 514 (1933). See
Bost v. Volunteer State Life Ins. Co., 114 S. C. 405, 103 S.E. 771 (1920) in which there
was a formal change of beneficiary to the insured's estate.

47. Hill v. Capital Life Ins. Co., 91 Colo. 300, 14 P. (2d) ioo6 (932); Roberts v.
Northwestern Nat. Life Ins. Co., I43 Ga. 780, 85 S. E. 1043 (1915); Indiana Nat. Life
Ins. Co. v. McGinnis, i8o Ind. 9,ioi N. E. 289 (1913) ; Holder v. Prudential Ins. Co.,
77 S.C. 299, 257 S.E. 853 (I9O7). The Roberts case is overruled in effect in Merchants'
Bank v. Garrard, I58 Ga. 867, 124 S.E. 715 (,924). The Holder case is expressly overruled in Antley v. New York Life Ins. Co., 139 S.C. 23, 137 S.E. ig (1927).
48. Hill v. Capital Life Ins. Co., 91 Colo. 300, 14 P. (2d) ioo6 (1932).
49. Townsend's Assignee v. Townsend, 127 Ky. 23o, 105 S.W. 937 (907); Moser v.
Conn. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 134 Ky. 215, 19 S.W. 792 (19o9).
5o. Moser v. Conn. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 134 Ky. 215, 119 S. W. 792 (Igo9).

5I. See, e. g., Mutual Benefit Life Ins Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 16o Ky. 538, 169 S. W.
(1914) (where the earlier Kentucky cases cited mtpra note 51 are distinguished on
this ground).
52. 5 COOLEY, op. cit supra note 4, 4731.
In Wheeler v. Pereles, Ex'r, 43 Wis. 332
1028

(1877), the assignee was held liable for conversion where he apparently surrendered the
policy before the insured defaulted.
53. Palmer v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 38 Misc. 318, 77 N. Y. Supp. 869 (1902). See
Toplitz v. Bauer, 36 App. Div. 623, 55 N. Y. Supp. 29 (Ist Dep't 1898), aff'd, 161 N. Y. 325,
55 N. E. 1059 (1900) (where the assignee's extension of time was held a waiver of the
expressly given right to surrender without notice).
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under the policy". 5 4 But where the assignment is simply "of my interest under
the policy"-the usual case-some courts have required that the assignee either
foreclose the insured's interest in a separate proceeding,55 or join the insured in
the action for the cash surrender value, 56 or cut off the insured's interest by a
public sale after notice to the insured.57 The reason for these requirements is to
prevent the assignee's destroying valuable privileges under the policy which the
insured might preserve if he were given the opportunity to do so by the sale or
foreclosure proceedings.58 Wilson, to use, v. Prudential Ins. Co., however,
makes none of these acts prerequisite to the assignee's recovery, and yet the rule
there adopted protects the insured and the assignee just as completely. In the
Wilson case, the assignee was held entitled to surrender the policy after having
notified the insured of his intent to apply for the cash surrender value. In this
way, the insured would be able himself to apply for a loan from the insurer on the
policy with which to pay the assignee (and still keep the policy in force) before
the assignee could surrender. The rule of the Wilson case equally with that
requiring foreclosure or sale prevents the insured from consuming the policy's
reserve by not paying the premium; it is not necessary to allow the assignee to
get the cash surrender value without notice in order to prevent such a diminution
of the assignee's security. Moreover, a public sale, aside from the opportunity it
gives the insured for redemption of the security, would serve no purpose in fixing
a fair value for the policy, since during the insured's lifetime the policy has no
greater value than its cash surrender value.55 The Wilson case, thus, strikes a
just mean between the rule requiring foreclosure of the insured's interest and a
rule which would give the assignee the cash surrender merely on application to
the insurer without notifying the insured.
In conclusion, there may be discerned in the solutions herein thought most
satisfactory to the problems presented by the cases of Lemley v.McClure, Kash's
Ex'r. v. Kash, and Wilson, to use, v. PrudentialIns. Co. something more than a
mere formal, legalistic consistency of principle in terms of which the results
reached by most courts faced with these problems may be explained. It should
be apparent, beyond this, that they have sought to avoid such fictions as are necessarily involved in calling an assignment or a surrender a change of beneficiary
or a change of beneficiary pro tanto, or in reading into an assignment by way of
security a power of sale without notice, as to which the assignment is silent.
When the courts avoid such fictions, the layman will, in all probability, more
readily understand the true nature of these acts in which he so frequently is
engaged, and the likelihood of courts reaching results more nearly in accord with
his intent when he did those acts will be very greatly increased.
N.L.P.
54. DuBrutz v. Bank of Visalia, 4 Cal. App. 2O, 87 Pac. 467 (i9o6).
55. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Twyman, 122 Ky. 513, 92 S.W. 335 (io6); Grossman v.

Lindemann, 67 Misc. 437, 123 N. Y. Supp. lo8 (igio).
56. This was suggested in the lower court opinion in Wilson, to use, v. Prudential Ins.
Co., 24 Pa. D. & C. 68, 73 (935), which was reversed by the Pennsylvania Superior Court
on the ground that it was sufficient if the assignee merely notified insured of his intent to
surrender the policy.
57. Dungan, Adm'x v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 46 Md. 469 (1877); Manton V.
Robinson, ig R. I. 405, 37 Atl. 8 (1896).
58. Nevertheless, the assignee was permitted to recover the cash surrender value without any evidence of notice to the insured or of waiver thereof in the assignment in Bank
of Idana v. Illinois Life Ins. Co., 135 Kan. 129, 9 P. (2d) 629 (1932) ; Mutual Benefit Life
Insurance Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 16o Ky. 538, 169 S. W. 1O28 (1914) and McGimpsey v.
Security B. & L. Ass'n, io N. J. Misc. 17, 157 Atl. 441 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
59. DuBrutz v. Bank of Visalia, 4 Cal. App. 2Ol, 87 Pac. 467, 468 (igo6).
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Res Ipsa Loquitur Doctrine in Pennsylvania
In Young v. Yellow Cab Co.1 the plaintiff was walking on the sidewalk, about
a foot and one-half from the curb. A cab of the defendant company was driving close to the curb. Suddenly a door opened and struck the plaintiff. The
Pennsylvania Superior Court, in affirming a judgment for the plaintiff, held the
following rule applicable to the case:
"When the thing which causes the injury is shown to be under the management of the defendants and the accident is such as in the ordinary course
of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper
care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an 2explanation by the
defendants, that the accident arose from want of care".
It is interesting that the court said nothing concerning the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur, but applied the above rule as presumably different from the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur.
A leading writer, nevertheless, has said that a res ipsa loquitur case is made
out "when certain types of harm occur under circumstances, which, from common experience, strongly suggest negligence and when the agency or instrumentality which occasioned the harm is under the exclusive control and management of defendant so that he is in a better position to prove his innocence
than the plaintiff is to prove his negligence." 8 This would seem to be the very
rule employed in the Young case. Yet the maxim res ipsa loquitur has a rather
limited application in Pennsylvania.
The doctrine was once declared by the court as "dangerous and uncertain
at best", 4 and a study of the opinions lends weight to the conclusion that the
doctrine is at least uncertain. In Zahinzer v. Pennsylvania Torpedo Co. (1899),
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court said: "The maxim 'Res ipsa loquitur,' is itself
the expression of an exception to the general rule that negligence is not to be
inferred but to be affirmatively proved. The ordinary application of the maxim
is limited to cases of an absolute duty, or an obligation amounting to that of an
insurer. Cases not coming under one or both of these heads must be those in
which the circumstances are free from dispute, and show not only that they were
under the exclusive control of the defendant, but that in the ordinary course
of experience no such result follows as that complained of." 5
Although from this it would appear that the maxim is applied, not only to
cases of common carrier and the like, but also to such other situations as would
fall under the traditional definition stated above, this interpretation has not been
followed. Thus, in Johns v. Pennsylvania R. R. (i9IO), the court said: "the
maxim res ipsa loquitur is an exception to the general rule that negligence is not
to be inferred, but must be affirmatively proved except in cases of absolute duty
or an obligation practically amounting to that of an insurer." 6
i. 118 Pa. Super. 495, i8o Atl. 63 (1935), quoting from Shafer v. Lacocock, Hawthorn
& Co., 168 Pa. 497, 504, 32 Atl. 44, 46 (1895).
2. Id. at 498, i8o Atl. at 64.
3. HARPER, ToRTs (1933) § 77, p. 183, and cases therein cited. 5 WiGmolE, EvmI-.c(2d ed. 1923) § 2509, p. 498, states that the following should be considered: "(i) the apparatus must be such that in the ordinary instance no injurious operation is to be expected unless
from a careless construction, inspection, or user; (2) both inspection and user must have
been at the time of the injury in the control of the party charged; (3) the injurious occurrence or condition must have happened irrespective of any voluntary action at the time by the
party injured."
4. Allen v. Kingston Coal Co., 212 Pa. 54, 61 Atl. 572 (1905).
5. 190 Pa. 350, 353, 42 Atl. 707, 7o8.
6. 226 Pa. 319, 321, 75 Atl. 408, 409.
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And this last view has been reiterated, with the important further statement
that there is a class of cases which comes close to that type of case where res
ipsa loquitur is applied, but entirely distinct, "where the circumstances are free
from dispute and were under the exclusive control of the defendant--cases where
the accident is such as, in the ordinary course of things, would not have occurred
if due care had been exercised, and in the absence of an explanation by defendant,
the happening of the accident affords an inference that it occurred from want
of due care." 7 This rule, which most jurisdictions would call res ipsa loquitur,
is termed the "exclusive control" doctrine. And even this doctrine is subjected
to ephemeral limitations.8
Various cases have confused the situation further. One seemed to destroy
any distinction, declaring that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies where
"'there is an absolute duty or obligation amounting practically to that of an insurer,' or where 'the transaction in which the accident occurred was in the exclusive management of the defendant, and all the elements of the occurrence were
within his control, and the result was so far out of the usual course that there
is no fair inference that it could have been produced by any other cause than
negligence'." 9 Another held that res ipsa loquitur did not apply on the ground
that "negligence is not presumed from the mere happening of the accident, but
from the circumstances under which it occurred." 10 Obviously, although the
statement quoted is an accurate statement of law, it alone is dearly not a valid
basis for rejecting res ipsa loquitur. In fact, all jurisdictions require that the
circumstances be shown before negligence may be inferred."1
The difficulty of determining just when the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
applies in Pennsylvania is, therefore, apparent from the foregoing opinions. It
may be valuable, however, to attempt to draw some rationale from the Pennsylvania cases involving res ipsa loquitur and the effect given it, and the "exclusive control doctrine" and the effect given it, without attempting to catalog all
the cases on the subject.' 2
The Application of The Pennsylvania Res Ipsa Loquitur Doctrine
In an early case, Laing v. Colder,18 involving a common carrier, the plaintiff, a passenger on the defendant's train, extended his arm out a window and was
thus injured. Although denying recovery, the court stated that "the mere happening of injurious accident, raises prima facie, a presumption of neglect, and
throws upon the carrier the onus of showing it did not exist." 14 This rule was
very harsh in that it required the carrier to explain all injuries occurring to passengers no matter how those injuries were suffered.
7. Fitzpatrick v. Penfield, 267 Pa. 564, 577, 1o9 Atl. 653, 658 (i92o).
8. See infra pp. 2,5 et seq.
9.Bryan v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 289 Pa. 123, 127, 137 Atl. 169,
10. Knox v. Simmerman, 3o Pa. 1, 151 Atl. 678 (i93o).

170 (1927).

This statement apparently had

its origin in the early common carrier cases. Laing v. Colder, 8 Pa. 479, 483 (848), stated
that "the mere happening of an injurious accident, raises, prima facie, a presumption of neglect. . . ." This obviously did not mean the plaintiff could allege he was injured and not
state the circumstances of how, when, and where the injury occurred. In Cresham v. Pennsylvania R. L,187 At. 51, 52 (Pa. Super. .936), the court, in referring to common carrier
cases, indicated that "it is the facts and circumstances connected with the injury of which
complaint is made that form the basis for a presumption of negligence and not the mere
injury."
ii. See HARPER, TORTS (933) § 77; Prosser, The ProceduralEffect of Res Ipsa Loquifur (1935) 20 MINN. L. REv. 241.
12. See EATON, RES IPSA LoQurruR

IN PENNSYLVANIA

(932).

The author lists prac-

tically all the cases which deal with res ipsa loquitur and the doctrine analogous to it.
13. 8 Pa. 479 (1848).
14. Id. at 483.
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Later decisions restricted this, requiring the plaintiff to show more than
the mere accident. Thus, in Thomas v. Philadelphia& Reading R. R., 5 a passenger, while sitting at an open window in one of the defendant's cars, was hit
by a missile which broke his arm. There was no evidence to show that it came
from any of the defendant's cars or how it got there. The court held that a passenger injured either by anything done or omitted by the carrier, its employees,
or any appliances, must show that the injury complained of resulted from the
breaking of machinery, collision, or something improper in the conduct of its
business, or in the appliances of transportation. This rule has been followed
strictly,' 6 and has been denominated res ipsa loquitur.
The same doctrine has been applied in cases where an electric light or telephone company, which had contracted to service the plaintiff, did so, the plaintiff suffering an injury due presumably to some faulty appliance of the defendant.
Thus, in Delahunt v. United Tel. & Tel. Co. 7 where plaintiff's intestate heard a
noise at the telephone and, upon picking up the receiver was instantly killed,
the court held there that the trial court was correct in applying the maxim res
ipsa loquitur because there was a duty owed to the deceased to furnish service
safely.
In these cases a contractual relationship is treated as a prerequisite to the
application of res ipsa loquitur, and it seems quite clear that until this relationship can be shown the maxim will not apply.' s
Once it has been held to apply, the question arises as to what effect is given
it. Is it to justify a mere inference by the jury in favor of the plaintiff? Or
does it have the effect of shifting the burden of proof in its fullest sense on the
defendant, 19 thus requiring him to give exculpatory evidence? As stated by one
eminent authority, 20 a presumption, in Pennsylvania, shifts the burden of proof
in its fullest sense, i. e., the defendant must go forward with the evidence and
bear the risk of persuasion. Hence, although the language of the decisions is
rather loose, it is necessary to see in these cases whether there is a true presumption or whether an inference is justified, with the "risk" of going forward with
the evidence satisfied by the plaintiff 21 but with the risk of persuasion still on him.
The common carrier cases hold that, when the presumption arises, "the
burden of proof is upon the carrier to show that such injury was in no way the
result of its negligence" ; 22 the carrier must "take up the burden of proof which
15. 148 Pa. i8o, 23 Atl. 989 (1892).
16. Wood v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co.,

260 Pa. 481, 485, 1o4 Atl. 69, 70 (I918);
Delaney v. Buffalo, R. & P. Ry., 266 Pa. 122, 125, log Atl. 6o5, 6o6 (1920) ; Burns v. Pennsylvania R. R., 294 Pa. 277, 280, 144 Atl. 103, 104 (1928).
In cases of injuries arising from x-rays, the court
17. 215 Pa. 241, 64 Atl. 515 (i9o6).
refuses to apply res ipsa loquitur, Nixon v. Pfahler, 279 Pa. 377, 124 Atl. I3O (1924), but

states that negligence in these cases may be proved by circumstances which would warrant
the inference of negligence.
18. Kepner v. Consolidated Tract. Co., 183 Pa. 24, 31, 38 Atl. 416, 417 (897) ; Steams
-v. Ontario Spinning Co., 184 Pa. 519, 523, 39 Atl. 292 (I898). Elevator and escalator cases
have been held analogous. Fox v. Philadelphia, 208 Pa. 127, 57 Atl. 356 (i9o4) ; Petrie v.
Kaufmann & Baer Co., 291 Pa. 211, 139 Atl. 878 (1927).

I9.I. e., the defendant not only runs the risk of producing evidence but must by a pre;ponderance of evidence show that he was not negligent. Wright v. Stroessley, 321 Pa. 1,182
Atl. 682 (1936).
20. Bohlen, The Effect of Rebuttable Presumptions of Law upon the Burden of Proof
(1920)

68 U. OF PA. L. RrV. 307.

21. Professor Bohlen is of the belief that the phrase "burden of going forward with the

,evidence" is a misnomer, since plaintiff may inadvertently give evidence favorable to the defendant and sufficient to discharge the "burden". Hence, it is not really a burden of going
forward with the evidence but simply a risk that evidence be produced.
22. Thomas v. Philadelphia & Reading R. R., 148 Pa. x8o, x83, 23 Atl. 989 (1892).
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the law put on it and show that the explosion was not due to the negligence of
the company or its employees." 23
In the electricity cases the court has given the presumption the following
effect: "the presumption is that it [defendant] was blamable, and it can escape
liability . . .only by persuading a jury that it [was not negligent, as] the bur,,24 This
been negligent..
den was upon the defendant to show that it had not
25
has been followed and approved in later cases.
In the above cases the burden of proof at the outset is on the plaintiff. In
view of the Pennsylvania rule that the party having the burden may receive a
directed verdict only on uncontradicted written evidence, 26 if plaintiff's evidence
of the facts invoking the maxim res ipsa loquitur is oral, plaintiff may not, on
principle, receive a directed verdict even though defendant fails to produce evidence. It would seem, however, that the rule of res ipsa loquitur could be enforced in such a situation by a conditional charge to the jury-that if they believe
the plaintiff's evidence they must find for him. The presumption is rebuttable by
the defendant and the question as to whether or not it has been rebutted is for
the jury.
Thus, the presumption given in these cases where res ipsa loquitur is applied has greater effect than a presumption in most jurisdictions, 28 and gives the
plaintiff what would seem to be an unwarranted advantage. The conceded purpose of the res ipsa loquitur rule is to equalize the position of the plaintiff and the
defendant, since it is practically impossible for the plaintiff to obtain evidence
which necessarily is in the control of the defendant.29 Thus, by simply giving the
plaintiff an inference, it equalizes the position of the plaintiff and the defenlant,
and still leaves the risk of persuading the jury upon the plaintiff. Hence the
Pennsylvania rule not only places the plaintiff in as good a position as the defendant, but gives him a decided advantage in that the defendant must not only
go forward with the evidence, but must also persuade the jury he was not negligent. This seems unduly harsh because in many cases the defendant has no
more knowledge of the facts than the plaintiff.
The Exclusive Control Doctrine
In virtually all cases where the facts are such that ordinarily res ipsa loquitur
would be applied, but where there is no contractual relationship, common carrier status, or obligation amounting to practically that of an insurer, the Pennsylvania court will apply in a limited sense the so-called exclusive control doctrine.2 0
The limitation is as follows:
"the evidence of negligence appears when the detailed explanation of the
circumstances immediately preceding the accident, the description of the
injuring appliance and the testimony from experience, show that the thing
which happened would not have happened had the injuring appliance or
thing been securely in place or properly cared for. The causal connection
is supplied, as is done in many other instances, by affirmative proof that the
Spear v. Philadelphia W. & B. R. Co., ii9 Pa. 61, 68, 12 Atl. 824, 826 (1888).
24. Alexander v. Nanticoke Light Co., 209 Pa. 571, 579, 58 At!. io68, 1071 (1904).
25. E. g., Lynch v. Meyersdale Electric Light, Heat, & Power Co., 268 Pa. 337, 112 Atl.
23.

58 (1920).
26. Sorenson v. Quaker City Advertising Co., 284 Pa. 2o9, 13o Ati. 432

(1925) ; Sunderland, Directing a Verdict for the Party Having the Burden of Proof (1913) 1I ,fcH.L.
REV. 198, 203.
27. McCafferty v. Pennsylvania R. R., 193 Pa. 339, 44 At. 435 (1899) ; Petnie v. Kaufmann and Baer Co., 291 Pa. 211, 139 Atl. 878 (1927).
28. PaossaR, op. cit. supra note ii,at 244.
29. See HAR'E, op. cst. supra note 3, at 184; WIGmORE, op. cit. supra note 3, at 498.
30. Fitzpatrick v. Penfield, 267 Pa. 564, 109 Atl. 653 (920).
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accident would not have happened had the thing been reasonably cared for,
so that in reality it is affirmative proof, the degree of proof required being
slight because of the duty imposed and the care required." 31
Assuming this to be the rule, an examination of the cases may indicate what
effect is given to the doctrine when applied, what evidence will meet this "slight
degree" of proof, and whether it is essential to every case.
In Geiser v. Pittsburgh Rys.3 2 the plaintiff's intestate was killed when the
front trucks of one of the defendant's cars passed a switch and the rear trucks
took it. The rear end of the car swung around, struck a telegraph pole, broke
the pole, and in falling killed the deceased. The allegation of negligence was that
a switch was defective.3 3 Testimony showed that the switch was worn flat, but
no evidence that this had caused the accident was shown. The trial court held
this was evidence of negligence, which, coupled with the exclusive control doctrine, was sufficient to allow the jury to infer negligence, and the judgment was
affirmed on the opinion of the trial court.
In Caffrey v. PhiladelphiaRapid Transit Co.,"4 where the injury was also
caused by the failure of a trolley to take a switch, the testimony was to the effect
that the car had jumped the track at that point on several different occasions
prior to the accident. The court held that this evidence taken in connection with
other circumstances (presumably the defendant's exclusive control and the unusual nature of the accident) was sufficient to warrant an inference on the part
of the jury that the defendant was negligent.
In a similar situation, but where the only evidence was that the car had
jumped the track, the court refused recovery on the ground that there was no
evidence which would reasonably suggest the cause of the accident.85 The court
thought any other rule would mean "that on merely showing the happening of
the accident, the defendant is liable for all resultant injuries." 36 A basis for this
reasoning may be found in Lanning v. PittsburghRys.8 7 where the court, commenting on the fact that the plaintiff had given no evidence other than the breaking of the trolley wire which had injured him, declared that "If a jury in an
action against a street railway company is to be permitted to find it guilty of
negligence because there is no apparent cause for the act complained of, it is
quite safe to assume that in every case the verdict will be for the plaintiff." 81 This
may be a very practical reason for requiring the plaintiff to give a slight degree
of proof, but it is questionable whether accidents of this type are frequent when
the defendant has not been negligent in some manner.
31. Id. at 578, iog Atl. at 658. It is difficult to understand just what limitation this
places upon the exclusive control doctrine. If it means that the plaintiff must prove specific
negligence on the part of the defendant, and then prove that the accident would not have happened but for this negligence, then it is in fact denying the plaintiff the benefit of the doctrine.
Since, in this type of case, in order to come under the doctrine the defendant was in exclusive
control of the circumstances, and the plaintiff did not have knowledge of the facts, it would
be impossible for plaintiff to show the causal connection between the negligent act and the
injury. Hence, it would seem that the courts, if they adhered to this limitation, would be
changing part of the substantive law of torts. Fortunately later decisions do not recognize
this limitation. See infra note 39.
32. 223 Pa. 170, 72 Atl. 35, (9o9).
33. Alleging specific acts of negligence will apparently not make proof of such acts necessary, and the jury may still infer negligence from the circumstances. Young v. Yellow Cab
Co., 118 Pa. Super. 495, i8o Atl. 63 (1935) ; see Heckel and Harper, Effect of the Doctrine
of Res Ipsa Loquitur (1928) 22 ILL. L. Ra,. 724, 726. But cf. McKnight v. Kresge, 285 Pa.
489, 495, 132 Atl. 575, 578 (1926).
34. 249 Pa. 364, 94 Atl. 924 (I915).

35.
36.
37.
38.

Livingstone v. Pittsburgh Rys., 64 Pa. Super. 593 (1916).
Id. at 6oo.
229 Pa. 575, 79 Atl. 336 (I911).
Id. at 578, 79 Atl. at 137.
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Thus, where the plaintiff was injured by a trolley car jumping the track it
was held that the position of the car after the collision, the fact that sparks were
seen coming from the car (these were not shown to have any connection with
the accident), and the fact that a spring was found near the scene of the accident (this was not identified with the particular car), coupled with the fact that
the car was in the exclusive control of the 9defendants, supported an inference
of negligence on the part of the defendant.
In the cases dealing with automobiles and other vehicles the exclusive control doctrine is applied with less emphasis placed upon its limitation. In Latella
v. Breyer Ice Cream Co.,40 the plaintiff had his car parked along the curb and
the defendant's driver, having charge of a team of horses, drove into the standing auto. Neither the plaintiff nor his witnesses saw the accident. The evidence
was that after the crash one of the witnesses saw a horse on the fender of the
car and the driver was on top of the machine. In affirming the judgment for the
plaintiff, the court applied what has been set out before as the exclusive control
doctrine. This case is interesting in that the court did not require even a slight
degree of proof that there had been negligence. The same rule was reiterated
in Malts v. Carter41 where the total evidence was that the plaintiff was riding
in the car of the defendant's intestate; the night was clear; the road dry; and the
car was being driven at a moderate speed.
The doctrine has been applied in such other situations as the falling of a
brick,4 2 the dumping of the contents of a freight train,43 the collapsing of a folding bed, 44 the falling of a window screen,45 the dropping of a safety gate, 40
and others too numerous to mention.
In all these cases applying the exclusive control doctrine, the plaintiff is
given the benefit of a permissible inference, that is, the jury may, from the evidence given, infer negligence on the part of the defendant.47 The risk of persuasion still remains on the plaintiff. 48 The defendant, in contrast with the common carrier defendant, does not have the burden of producing exculpatory evidence.
39. Maerkle v. Pittsburgh Rys., 311 Pa. 517, 165 Atl. 503 (1933).

Of the above evi-

dence it would seem that the only fact probative of negligence would be the position of the
car after the accident. It is not questioned that this would be a circumstance in permitting
the jury to infer negligence, but it is interesting to note that, by so holding, the court is in fact
refuting the limitation upon the exclusive control doctrine which was stated in Fitzpatrick v.
Penfield, 267 Pa. 564, 1O9 At. 653 (1920): "evidence of negligence appears when the detailed
explanation [is made] of the circumstances immediately preceding the accident. . . ." Obviously the position of the car after the accident would not meet this requirement.
40. 87 Pa. Super. 325 (1926).
41. 311 Pa. 55o, 166 Atl. 852 (1933).

42. Booth v. Dorsey, 208 Pa. 276, 57 Atl. 562 (19o4) ; cf. Joyce v. Black, 226 Pa. 408,
75 Atl. 602 (igio), where the court stated that affirmative proof of negligence must be shown
and that res ipsa loquitur did not apply; the court did not consider the exclusive control doctrine.
43. Janock v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 252 Pa. 199, 97 Atl. 205 (1916).
44. Lyttle v. Denny, 222 Pa. 395, 71 Atl. 841 (19o9).
45. Murray v. Frick, 277 Pa. 19o, 121 Atl. 47 (1923).

46. Sgier v. Philadelphia & Reading Ry., 260 Pa. 343, 1O3 Atl. 73o (ii8). In Rozumailski v. Philadelphia Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 296 Pa. xi4, 145 AtI. 7oo (929), plaintiff
was injured by ground glass in a bottle of the defendant's beverage. The court apparently
applied the exclusive control doctrine.
47. Campbell v. Consolidated Traction Co., 201 Pa. 167, 50 Atl. 829 (19o2) ; Booth v.
Dorsey, 208 Pa. 276, 57 Atl. 562 (19o4) ; Geiser v. Pittsburgh Rys., 223 Pa. 170, 72 Atl. 351
(igog) ; Janock v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 252 Pa. 299, 97 Ati. 205 (ii6).
48. Wright v. Straessley, 321 Pa. 1, 6, i82 Atl. 682, 684 (1936).
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Conclusion
Confusion can be seen to exist. Nevertheless, the following conclusions can
be drawn:
i. In cases where there is a contractual relationship between the plaintiff
and defendant, or where the defendant is a common carrier and plaintiff a passenger, or where the defendant deals in a commodity which is dangerous if not
carefully handled, the rule of res ipsa loquitur will be applied. The effect will
be to shift the burden of proof in the fullest sense to the defendant. The plaintiff need show only the circumstances under which the accident happened.
2. In all other cases where the circumstances are under the exclusive control of the defendant, where the accident is not in the ordinary course of events
and where the plaintiff is not himself at fault, the jury may infer negligence on
the part of the defendant. The plaintiff must show with as much detail as possible the attendant circumstances. He has also the so-called burden of proof in
that he must persuade the jury that the defendant was negligent. 49

Thus, although Pennsylvania applies the maxim res ipsa loquitur to very
few cases, 0 it applies it in a rather stringent manner, whereas it applies to the
other cases exactly what most jurisdictions would term res ipsa loquitur and
reaches exactly the same result, but invokes it by some other name and thereby
avoids giving it the extreme effect of a Pennsylvania presumption.
The most plausible explanation for this condition of the law seems to lie
in this peculiar effect Pennsylvania gives to presumptions and therefore to the
rule of res ipsa loquitur. The courts were quite willing to impose the burden
of proof on the defendant in the cases where any idea of absolute duty existed,
as in contractual relationships; they were confronted with language of absolute
liability in carrier cases and with the common-law idea that the carrier must
explain all losses. But the courts did not feel constrained to reach the same result
in other situations. There was no particular policy favoring the plaintiff. Therefore, it was not difficult to reject the maxim res ipsa loquitur where no contractual
relationship or its equivalent existed, and to apply a different rule of circumstantial evidence," sometimes calling it the exclusive control doctrine, but limiting its
effect to the ordinary effect given to res ipsa loquitur in the majority of jurisdictions. Harshness and injustice to ordinary defendants was thereby avoided.
Employing a different label is in itself innocuous. But definitions rendered
obiter dictum and the peculiar attempt to distinguish res ipsa loquitur from circumstantial
evidence of negligence have been responsible for the existing con52
fusion.

W. A. O'D., Jr.
49. See Wright v. Straessley, 321 Pa. i, 4 , 182 AtI. 682, 684 (1936).
5o. See PROSSER, op. cit. supra note ii; Bohlen, Aviation Under the Common Law
(934)

48 HLARv. L. REv. 216, 230, n. 34.

5i. Kapusciousld v. Philadelphia & R. C. & D. Co., 289 Pa. 388, 392, 137 AtI. 619, 620

(i927), termed the rule the proving of negligence by circumstantial evidence.
52. Gormley v. Union Paving Co., 95 Pa. Super. 78 (1928) ; Knox v. Simmerman, 3oi
Pa. i, II Atl. 678 (I93O) ; Maltz v. Carter, 311 Pa. 550, i66 Atl. 852 (933).

